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In this review of consumption of base metals,  intensity of raw materials consumption per unit
steel, and agricultural raw materials, the author  of output continued with only temporary inter-
focuses on the causes for the drastic sluwdown in  ruptions at times of high oil prices. This was
the consumption growth rate after the first oil  because of relatively rapid expansion of materi-
pricc shock. From a range of 4 percent to 10  als-intensive sectors and lags in adapting to the
percent annually for most metals, the growth  latest materials-efficient technologies. The
rates decli.icd to I percent to 2 percent. Whether  developing countries - especially the rapidly
the post-1973 decline in demand for raw materi-  industrializing countries - will continue to
als represents an irreversible structural change is  provide the main growth market for raw materi-
important for developing countries that depend  als in the 1990s.
heavily on exports of those commodities. And
viewNs  on this issue have been divergent.  Stadstical tests of alternative hypotheses
suggest that the downturn has been only partly
The fact that the decline started when oil  cyclical. There is not strong evidence to support
prices increased suggests that the energy-saving  the view that it was a one-time improvement in
drive, thro.lgh material substitution and techno-  the efficiency o  -awv  materials use.
logical changes, and the adverse macroeconomic
impact of highec,  energy prices had detrimental  The most plausible explanation, supported
effects on consumption of these materials. For  by statistical evidence, is that materials-saving
agricultural raw materials, the decline has been  technological changes have accelerated, prob-
much less pronounced. Any increase in consump-  ably because of higher energy prices. Whether
tion of cotton and natural rubber that resulted  those chapres will continue at the accelerated
from higher costs of synthetic fibers and rubber  rate when energy prices are lower remains to be
must have been relatively small.  seen. Recent data suggest that the rate may
already have slowed down, which supports a
Most of the decline in raw materials con-  more cautiously optimistic outlook for develop-
sumption occurred in the industrial economies. In  ing countries' exports of raw materials than
developing countries, the trend increase in the  prevailed in the early 1980s.
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This paper reviews movements in raw  materials consumption over the past 30
years.  Included in this review are all base metals  (aluminum, copper, iead,
nickel,  tin,  and zinc)  and  steel, and  important agricultural  raw materials
(cotton  and rubber). These primary commodities share the common characteristic
that they are used as inputs in manufacturing and construction. Some metals and
minerals (e.g.,  manganese, titanium, phosphate rock, etc.), energy commodities,
and timber products are not included in this review for various reasons.  The
period reviewed is from 1961 to 1988.
A prominent characteristic of the metals market during the past 15 years
has  been  its very  slow  growth.  In  some years  consumption  of  several  raw
materials has even  declined.  Explaining the  causes of  this slowdown, in  the face
of moderate economic  growth, has become  a topical  issue.  The  slowdown has
important  implications for  a number of developing countries that rely heavily on
exports of these materials. The severity and persistence of post-1973 declines
in metals intensity per unit of GNP, as shown by Tilton  (1985), prompted the
conjecture that it may have been structural.  This paper reviews the debate on
thie issue, including results of statistical tests.
Technological  and  scientific innovations  have  long  been  providing synthetic
alternatives  to  primary or raw  materials. In  particular,  the 1980s have  witnessed
significant advances in materials science, with a potential to save or replace
primary materials in  many end uses. These  developments as  they affect individual
commodities are also reviewed.
The  next  section  summarizes the  trends  in raw  materials  consumption.
Section III reviews the technological developments relating to raw materials
consumption. Section IV discusses the structural change hypothesis. The last
section draws some conclusions.
-1-It. TRENDS IN RAW MATERIALS CONSUMPTION, 1961-1988
Table 1 shows growth rates of raw materials consumption for  major country
groups.  For all raw  materials and  all country  groups except for  nickel and  rubber
in developing cou^ntries,  demand growth rates slowed drastically after the first
oil price shock in 1973/74. The sharp decline in consumption growth has been a
subject of great concern, especially to developing*  couintry  producers of these
commodities.  Investigations  as  to  its  causes  have  generated  considerable
literature,  which is  reviewed in  Section IV.  MWch of the literature,  however, did
not have  the benefit of observing that growth rates of raw  materials consumption
sharply increased in industrial countries when oil prices collapsed after late
1985.  Developing countries  showed  moderate increases  in  consumption  but  there has
been no sign of an upturn from trend growth, except for tin and rubber. Growth
rates of raw materials consumption in the formerly centrally planned economies
of  Eastern Europe and USSR  were lower  during 1986-88 than in any  of the preceding
periods.
It would seem more than a coincidence that such clear discontinuities in
raw  materials  consumption  growth  took  place  at  times  of  major  changes  in
petroleum prices. Energy prices could affect raw  materials demand in  three ways:
first, by changing the costs of synthetic substitates; second, through energy-
capital and energy-materiaJ.,  complementarity as inputs into production, both
within  any  given  production  r3chnology  as well  as through  technical change
induced by higher energy prices; and third, through its macroeconomic effects.
Immediately following the first oil  price shock,  analysts expressed optimism for
the future of raw materials, particularly rubber and cotton.  They expected
synthetic rubber, fibers, and  plastics would become  more expensive and therefore
the  demand for  natural raw  materials  would increase.  Subsequent  experience showed
that  this expectation was too  optimistic.  Although cotton  and natural rubber  have
made a comeback over the past 15 years (see  Table 1), it  was due more to changes
in technology  and  taste  than  to  relative costs  (see next  section). Market
penetration of plastics accelerated, if anything, thanks to the energy-saving
-2-TABLE  1:  GROWTH RATES  CF  RAW MATERIALS  CONSUMPTION
(Percent  psL annum)
------------------------------------------------------------------ ___---------__-
Industrial  Developing  Eastern Europe  World
Countries  Countries  G USSR  Total
A  B  C  A  B  C  A  B  C  A  B  C
Steel  5.5  -1.1  8.5  7.6  4.6  0.8  5.4  1.5  1.0  5.7  0.7  4.1
Aluminum  10.0  0.9  5.9  16.4  6.4  4.4  7.3  1.3  1.1  9.9  1.7  4.8
Copper  4.3  0.3  2.7  7.2  6.0  5.1  4.9  1.4  -0.5  4.6  1.3  2.5
Lead  3.4  0.0  2.4  7.0  3.8  1.0  5.6  1.2  0.5  4.2  0.9  1.7
Zinc  5.7  -1.2  3.2  6.9  5.6  4.0  6.1  1.5  3.1  5.9  0.6  3.4
Tin  1.8  -2.1  3.2  2.6  2.7  4.4  0.9  1.7  -2.0  1.8 -0.6  2.4
Nickel  6.9  1.2  9.7  6.4  7.2  2.6  3.7  2.3  -1.2  6.2  1.9  6.3
Cotton  -1.3  -0.1  0.2  5.4  3.5  2.2  2.6  0.3  -1.5  2.5  2.1  1.3
Rubber  3.8  1.5  5.2  5.9  5.8 13.2  0.1 -3.9 -10.8  3.5  2.3  6.9
--------------------------------------------------------------------- __------__--




Source: International Economics Department, World Bank.
-3-drive in industrial  countries. It seems clear,  therefore, that the technological
and macroeconomic effects of the oil shocks dominated over the substitution
effect away  from synthetiCs; overall, higher energy prices  had a depressing
effect on raw materials demand.
Divergent  trends  in  growth  rates  between  industrial  and  developing
countries partly reflect the relocation of raw materials-using industries from
industrial  to developing countries.  Consumption statistics for raw  materials, as
those in Table 1, are usually compiled at the initial stage of processing; for
example, consumption of raw cotton by cotton mills. Consumption in the form of
intermediate and final products, such as cotton fabrics and clothing, is not
captured in the statistics. A  large part of the high growth rate of cotton
consumption in developing countries reflects the persistent movement of  textile
ranufacturing  from  high-income  to low-income  countries.  The same  process  also has
been taking place in one degree or another for all other raw materials-using
industries.
Since Malenbaum  (1973), analyses of metals consumption have  focu ad on
explaining changes in the intensity-of-use, or  metals consumption per unit of
output. Charts 1-3 show the changes in metals intensity in the industrial and
developing country groups with respect to GDP and the investment component of
GDP, or GDI.1  These confirm Tilton's (1986) observation of a sharp post-1973
downturn in the intensity of steel and non-ferrous metals per unit of GDP. For
agricultural raw materials, however, the 1973/74 benchmark does not provide a
clear break in the long-term trend.
The charts further show that, for  the metals, declines in the intensities
with respect to GDI have been less pronounced than for GDP. This is because
consumption of metals is  more closely linked  to production of capital goods than
to total output. Before the first oil price shock, metals consumption per unit
I  Base metals and cotton and rubber are aggregated into totals for non-
ferrous metals and agricultural raw materials, using 1979-81 prices as weights.
-4-of GDP  and GDI were  roughly constanc  ir.  industrial countries, while  in the
developing  countries,  the intensities  had  been increasing.  The  intensities in  the
industrial countries  declined sharply in  the wake of  the two oil  price shocks  and
ensuing economic recession. In  recent years, the intensities have stabilized (or
picked up slightly) at relatively low levels. In the develnping countries, the
upturn in  the intensities continued  by and large  throughout the period, although
with some interruptions following the oil price shocks.
The data allow us to calculate the contribution of changes in  the share of
GDI in GDP to changes in the metals intensity of GDP. Between 1961 and 1973 in
the industrial countries, the base metals intensity of GDP  increased at  1.3%
p.a.,  and  about  half  of  this  increase  resulted  from  the  increase  in  the
investment share  of  GDP and  the other half from  the increase in the intensity  per
unit of  GDI. Between 1973  and 1988,  however, the  metala intensity  of  GDP declined
at 2.3% p.a.; 57% of the decline was contributed by a decrease in the share of
GDI in GDP and the remainder by reduced metals intensity of GDI. This finding
contrasts with Tilton's conjecture that the post-1973 decline  in the metals
intensity  of  GDP  was  more  due  to  metal-saving  technological  change  and
substitution away from  metals than to changes in the output mix. 2 His statement
was based on data up to  1982. Since 1982, the overwhelming direct cause of
decline in  metals intensity  of GDP has been the downturn in  the investment share
of  GDP. In the  developing countries,  the metals intensity  of  GDP increased during
both 1961-73 and 1973-88, and the dominant cause of the increase has been the
steady rise in the metals intensity of investment, more so during 1973-88 than
during 1961-73.
2  Examples of such technologic&! changes end substitutions are numerous.
Thinner coatings of tin, nickel and zinc as well as the use of thinner- and
smaller-gauge  aluminum and copper lead  to savings  of these metals. The oil price
shock of 1973 stimulated the automobile industry to downsize and substitute for
better fuel efficiency, by means such as smaller batteries, and substitution of
copper for aluminum and plastics. The fiber optics technology almost totally
eliminated copper use in telecommunications.
-5-CHART  1:  STEEL  INTENSITIES
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-6-CHART  2: BASE-METALS  INJTENSITY
(  WITH fESPECT  TO  GOP AND  INVESTMENT)
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-7-CHART  3:  AGRI,  RAW MATERIALS  INTENSITY
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-8-III. TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS  IN RAW MATERIALS CONSUMPTION
Savings  raw materials consumption have been achieved for the entire
spectrum  of  their  life-cycle,  from  mining  and  processing  to  end  use  and
recycling. At the mining and processing stages, there have jeen technological
improvements to enhance metals recovery from ores. In the case of copper, the
solvent extraction/electro-inning process (SxEw)  allowed large copper recov-y
from waste dumps. The continuous casting technology in steel-making saved not
only energy but also reduced iron ore losses from 10% to 2-4%. However, most
savings have  been attained in various end-uses  of materials through: ai)  product
downsizing and miniaturization, (ii)  improv3ments in the efficiency of use,
and (iii)  development of substitutes.  Recently, savings through recycling of raw
materials have come  into focus,  mainly out of concern  for the environmental
impact of materials wastage.  In this section we will focus on technological
developments in end uses and recycling for each raw material.
Steel
The most significant  development in steel  use has been the introduction  of
high strength low alloy steel (HSLA),  which is about three times stronger than
that of 10 years ago. Today, about half of the world's steel output is of the
HSLA variety. Obviously, HSLA saves steel  by delivering higher strength for less
weight. This I-,..s  been an important feature in the post-1974 period, when energy
saving required less weight in  automobiles,  the most important  market for steel.
The HSLA technology has been instrumental in protecting steel's market
share in automobile manufacturing and other end uses. Steel's main competitors
in automobiles have been plastics and aluminum. Plastics' main  attraction in
automobiles is its low weight, no rusting, and easy formability and hence low
manufacturing cost. Its disadvantages are the lack of ductility and difficulty
in recycling. Aluminum's advantage is its low weight.
-9-Plastics  have made  significant  inroads  in automobiles,  in  interiors,
bumpers, and  various casings  and  containers.  The  weight of plastic  materials used
in the average automobile manufactured in  Western Europe increased from 35kg in
1970  to 98kg currently, or from  3% of the  total weight of the average  car to 10%.
US automobile manufacturers have been using more plastic per car than their
European counterparts, but the gap has narrowed to about 10% above the European
level in terms of the total weight of plastics used per car. The main area of
future expansion of plastics use  in automobiles is in exterior body panels.
However,  plastics are facing  major  obstacles in  this application. First,  plastics
are more expensive than steel at a production volume of 50,000 units or more.
Second, the lack of ductility of plastics puts it  at a  disadvantage in collision
damage repair. Third, plastics do not yield a metallic surface finish, a highly
desired quality by consumers. Fourth, difficulty of recycling has become an
increasingly formidable problem for full-scale use of plastics in automobiles.
There have been a  few plastic-body models developed in recent years, but they
have  not become  popular.  Plastics  are not  likely to make  major  inroads in
automobile bodies before the end of this decade. There are, however, a number of
other applications of plastics in automobiles so that its use will continue to
increase although at a slower rate than in the past.
The potential for substitution of steel by plastics also exists in the
construction sector.  Polymer-reinforced  concrete is  lighter  and  more durable  than
steel-reinforced concrete, and has been used  in construction of tunnels and
canals.
The  automobile  industry  also  has  been  looking  into  advanced  ceramic
materials for use in engines and other heat-resistant components. The ceramic
engine  technology  still has  a  long way  to  go  in  order to  find widespread
applications. Various ceramic, polymeric, and metallic composite materials are
continuing to be developed to improve performance characteristics of specific
components that have been made with conventional materials,  including steel.
However, costs of such  materials tend to  be high, and  thus the total  displacement
-10-of steel by such materials probably will not amount to a substantial proportion
(see Il8chner (1986)].
CoDnier
Product  miniaturization  and  substitution have  reduced the  demand  for
copper. The effects of miniaturization, however, have been  largely offset by
increased demand  for products,  stimulated in part  by  lower product prices.
Recently, there have been indications that substitution for copper has slowed
down. For example, copper consumption per unit of automobile production has
increased as more electronic gadgets have been added.
Copper has been under pressure from various competing materials, notably,
aluminum,  plastics,  and  optical  fibers.  This  competitive  pressure  covered
practically all end-uses of copper, such as electrical wiring, plumbing tubes,
heat exchange equipment, and various al.oys. Aluminum almost totally displaced
copper in high-tension electrical transmission cables. However, building wires
are  still predominantly made with copper. Furthermore, copper wires  are the
standard in  practically all electrical equipment, ranging from  power generators
to  computers.  Thus,  copper  is  still used  extensively  in many  industrial
activities.  Aluminum also  has  been  displacing copper in  heat  exchange equipment,
such  as  automobile  radiators  (because of  its  lighter  weight)  and  cooking
utensils. This process is likely  to continue, particularly in the United States
and Japan where copper still holds the dominant share of the market.
Plastics hold a clear cost advantage over copper in plumbing tubes and
fixtures.  There  is, however, the  perception that  plastic pipes  are  somehow
inferior to copper pipes, and perhaps unreliable.  However, copper is highly
vulnerable in this market; the quality of plastics could improve to eventually
dominate the market.
The most recent trend in substitution against copper is the use of optical
-11-fibers in telecommunications. Because of  its superior technical  advantages,
optical fibers have completely dominated the long-distance communications cable
market. However, Tan (1986)  estimates  that the  total amount  of  copper consumption
to be  lost to optical  fibers will be only  about 3% of total  annual copper
consumption. At the user-end of  telecommunications, copper wires are used inside
and  outside  various  terminals.  Since  optical  fibers would  lower  costs  of
telecommunications  and  hence  increase  its  use,  the  net  impact  on  copper
consumption may not be all negative. A major technological innovation looming
over  the horizon is  the  possibility  of room-temperature  superconducting  material,
which potentially could have a devastating effect on copper demand.
Aluminum
Until very  recently, aluminum has enjoyed the most  spectacular demand
growth  among  base  metals.  This  was  made  possible  by  aggressive  product
development and market penetration. It is widely believed that the strategy,
although still being vigorously pursued, is increasingly facing the problem of
market saturation and competition from high-tech composite materials.
The most significant  technological development in  the use of aluminum for
packaging has been the progressive "thinning" of aluminum beverage cans. Since
aluminum is  more expensive than tinplate (tin-coated  steel), it was by means of
thinning that aluminum was able to penetrate the beverage can market. In food
packaging that requires vacuum packing, thinning was not feasible; as a result
the market largely remains in the domain of tin cans and plastics.
The light weight and relatively high strength of aluminum  has been the
main attraction in  applications where weight reduction is  a major concern, as in
aircraft and automobiles. Aluminum and aluminum/titanium alloys have been the
main materials of aircraft; a Boeing 767 aircraft is made of 81% aluminum, 14%
steel, 3% composite material, and 2% titanium. It was thought that composite
materials would overtake aluminum in  the 1990s  as  the  main  material of  commercial
-12-aircraft. However, it seems  unlikely  that this  will happen  because of the  massive
investments  required for  the  transition and  the  relatively high cost  of composite
materials. The aluminum industry continues to come up with improved aluminum
alloys with greater strength and fatigue resistance, to find applications not
only in  aircraft  and automobiles,  but also in  ships  and trains (for  high-pressure
containers), and numerous other applications.
Lead
Batteries have been the most important end-use sector for lead.  About 81%
of the net increase in lead consumption  during 1986-88  was for increased battery
production.  End uses such  as  cable sheathing,  alloys, and  gasoline  additives have
been declining in absolute terms as well as in terms of their relative shares.
Since the first oil price  shock of 1973/74, automotive batteries have
undergone  major technological changes  that led  to  downsizing of  batteries  without
sacrificing  power. This  was achieved mainly by the development of thinner grids
that reduced the lead content of typical automotive batteries. It is estimated
that the lead content of an average battery in the United States declined from
10.5 kg in the early 1970. to about 7  kg in recent years and has stabilized at
that level. Similar declines, from 9.7 kg to 6.5 kg, are also estimated  for
Japan. These declinos, however, have been more than compensated for  by increases
in  battery production.  During 1983-88,  world battery  production increased  at 3.5%
p.a.
The average battery life also has increased --  up to 5 years in Europe
where ten years ago it was 2.5 to 3 years. In the United States and Japan, an
average battery  life of 3.3 to  4 years has become the norm.  Recently, the
increasing use  of  electronic  equipment  in automobiles  has demanded  greater
reserve  power  in batteries. Research  to  improve battery performance  is now
focused on providing reserve power as well as cold-cranking ability. Until such
-13-improvements  have been made, these demands  may result in  a temporary increase in
lead consumption per batteries.
Data  available for the United States indicate that batteries  used  for
industrial  purposes  have  been  the  most  rapidly  increasing  segment  of  lead
consumption, increasing  at 9.6%  p.a. during  the last five  years (in  terms of the
total sales  value of industrial batteries). The fastest growing industrial uses
for batteries are in providing stand-by power, which means large batteries to
store  electricity  to  provide  emergency  power.  A  particularly  promising
application of large-scale batteries is in  peak load  management, currently under
experimentation at US electric utilities.
Demand growth in rolled and extruded lead products, and in pigments and
other compounds, is likely  to be mostly offset by declines in markets for cable
sheathing, alloys,  and  gasoline additives.  Plastics  will  continue  to replace lead
in cable sheathing, although at slower rates than in the past. Many developing
countries still use leaded gasoline and this practice  will come under increasing
pressure because of health and environmental concerns. For the same reason, the
lead content of solder, the main lead alloy, will continue to decline. Lead in
pigments and other compounds that do not pose health risks has been increasing
and will continue to increase. Among the rolled and extruded products and other
miscellaneous uses, the promising areas for future growth are in nuclear waste
management  and  protection  from  radiation,  lead  roofing  and  pipes,  and  in
galvanizing.
Zinc
The largest and the fastest growing market for zinc is the galvanizing
market, currently accounting for  about half  of zinc  consumption. The galvanizing
market for zinc has been adversely affected by two technological developments.
One  is  the  progressively  thinner  coatings  of  zinc  and  the  other  is  the
-14-introduction  of zinc  alloys such  as  Galvalume (55%  aluminum, 43.5% zinc,  and 1.5%
silicone)  and Galfan  (5% aluminum  and  95%  zinc)  as  the  coating  material.
Increased  adoption of electrolytic  galvanizing  in place of  the  hot dipping
method, because of the former's  more uniform and thinner coating properties, has
reduced the overall thickness of zinc coating in galvanized steel. In electro-
galvanizing itself,  the coating thickness has been reduced through improvements
in technology. Galvalume provides better corrosion protection than does zinc at
the cost of  some undesirable properties. Galfan has shown greater corrosion
resistance than zinc without  losing the desirable properties of  zinc. It is
estimated that between the 1960s and the early 1980s, zinc consumption per ton
of galvanized steel declined by 8.7%.  Continued research and develoDment in this
area  is expected  to bring  about  further declines  in the  zinc  intensity of
galvanized  steel.  However,  the  drive  to  improve  the  product  quality  of
manufactures will require better corrosion protection and hence more widespread
use of galvanized steel. The most dramatic example has been in the automobile
sector, where, during the 1982-86 period, the amount of zinc used for corrosion
protection in an average automobile increased  by 45% in the United States. Many
other product categories offer opportunities for increased use of galvanized
steel, such as construction beams and posts.
Zinc-based alloys for  diecasting have  widespread industrial applications,
the  most  important  of  which  is  in  automobiles.  However,  zinc  diecasts  in
automobiles  have  been  under  intense competitive  pressure  from  plastics  and
aluminum as  the drive for fuel  efficiency  has required lighter  products. The zinc
industry's answer to this challenge was  the introduction  of thin-walled diecasts
which helped stabilize the share of zinc  diecasts but reduced the amount of zinc
used. As a result, zinc diecasts used per automobile produced  in the United
States declined from 64 lb in 1967 to 20 lb in 1986. Consumption of zinc-based
alloys is  expected to  grow roughly in line  with industrial  production, unless  the
pressure of substitution intensifies because of the high cost of zinc or for
other reasons.
-15-Brass  and  bronze,  long  used  widely  for  a  variety  of  purposes,  are
considered to be mature products with little scope for market expansion. Their
consumption has generally been declining.  (Brass is used mainly  in plumbing
fixtures and for heat-exchange components such  as automobile radiators.) Both of
these markets have been and  will continue  to  be under strong competitive  pressure
from plastics and aluminum.
Nickel
Nickel  is used  mostly  in alloys with  other metals.  Such  alloys  have
desirable  properties,  the  most  important  of  which  are  high  resistance  to
corrosion and  high tensile strength  at  elevated  temperatures. Nickel is  also  used
for  electro-plating  and  high-technology  electrical  batteries;  its  largest
potential use is in  battery-operated electric cars. Stainless steel  has been the
largest and fastest growing  market for  nickel. Various other nickel-based alloys
also have shown good growth.
Nickel could be substituted by other metals as the alloying element or by
other non-nickel-based alloys. However, in most cases substitution of nickel
entails a sacrifice of nickel's unique physical and chemical properties, or
require  higher  cost.  The  most  serious  competitor  is  aluminum,  which  can
substitute  for  stainless  steel  and  nickel/chromium  alloy  in  automobile
applications.
Cotton and Rubber
Synthetic fibers and rubber provided the classic examples of natural raw
materials being displaced  by synthetic  substitutes.  The share  of  synthetic fibers
in  world total fiber consumption increased  from 37.5% in 1970  to 46% in 1977,  and
has remained in the 45-49% range since then. There have not been pronounced and
sustained increases in this share after the oil price shocks.
-16-The share of natural rubber in total rubber consumption declined steadily
from 53% in 1960 to 34.6% in 1970 and to 30% in 1988. During the last 15 years,
the increasing market share  of radial tires in  total tire consumption has helped
to maintain the market share of natural rubber. Natural rubber ha. found use in
a wide  range of producer and consumer goods other than tires.  Today, tires
account for about half of natural rubber consumption. Technology has played a
major role in developing non-tire markets for natural rubber, such as hoses,
belts, shoes, gloves and  medical applications.
IV.  STRUCTURAL  CHANGE  IN  RAW  MATERIALS DEMAND
The  severity  and  persistence  of  post-1973  declines  in  metals  intensities
(see  Section  II)  prompted  the  conjecture  that  it may  have  been  "structural."
Although this term has not been defined precisely, it broadly implied permanent
and irreversible shifts in demand for raw materials,  and hence a pessimistic
outlook  for  developing countries  heavily  dependent  on exports  of  those  materials.
This section summarizes the current state of the debate on this subject.
The post-1973 trends in  metals consumption permit three broadly different
interpretations. 3 The first is the cyclical interpretation, which views the
decline in metals intensity as resulting largely from a prolonged downturn in
economic growth and investment.  This view rejects the notion that there has been
a sudden acceleration in the rate of materials-saving technological progress.
Technological change continuing at the long-term trend rate does not qualify as
a structural change. The recent upsurge in  metals consumption  has given new life
to this view, as expressed by  Crowson (1989),  for example.  The second is  the  view
that  after  the  first oil  price  shock there  has  been  a one-time  flurry of
3  Since the trends in  cotton and rubber consumption do not lend themselves
to a structural change interpretation,  the following discussion will focus only
on metals.
-17-materials-saving technological innovations and such changes are here to stay.
Metals intensity has  been permanently shifted downward and will resume the long-
term trend but from the lower level, even if oil prices return to the pre-1973
level. The third view  is  that high oil prices have set in  motion a process that
permanently changed the materials demand relationship, accelerating the rate of
substitution, technological change, and changes in the mix of output. Drucker
(1986),  for  example,  writes that the  raw  materials economy has  become "uncoupled"
from  the industrial economy. Larson,  Ross and  Williams (1986)  cite the following
as causes of  "fundamental structural change": substitution of new materials;
design  changes  to  enhance  efficiency  of  materials  use;  saturated  consumer
markets; and increased use of less materials-intensive goods. The  :r'  losition
outlined  by  these  authors  was  generally  termed  the  "structural  change
hypothesis."
These  different interpretations  of what  has happened  over  the last  15  years
have important implications for the future of raw materials. However, it is not
easy to assess their relative merits with the available information. One way of
testing their validity  is by standard econometric hypothesis testing in the
context of  a demand model for metals.  A formal test of the structural change
hypothesis was  carried out using an extended  demand model  for metals  [see,
Choe(1989)]. In an extension of the traditional metals demand models that have
focused only on the prices of the metal and its close substitutes, the demand
function is derived from an aggregate cost function that includes all relevant
factor inputs. The  motivations for  this are  twofold: tests for structural change
require  a fully specified demand model and the  implications of energy price
shocks during the perir<d  should be taken into consideration.
Suppose that  output, Q, is  produced  with four  variable inputs  --  labor (L),
energy  (E), metal  (M), and other materials  (S) --  and one quasi-fixed input,
capital  (K). This  is the familiar KLEM  framework widely  used in studies of
aggregate factor demand.  Further suppose that the cost function is quadratic,
-18-and assume biased technical progress (in Hick'. sense) and non-constant returns
to scale. Then, the metals demand function is expressed as:
M  =  aM  +  a,  t +  PM PM  +  PE  PE
+  Ps Ps  +  PQ  Q +  Pr  K,
where PM,  for example, is the price of the metal and t stands for time trend.
In the context of the demand model above, structural change is defined as
changes in the parameters of the model. The cyclical view asserts no change in
the parameters has taken place. The one-time technical shift view may best be
represented by a shift in the intercept term, aM. The third structural change
view would involve shifts in all or a subset of  the parameters, particularly, a,,
Ps,  and o.
The model  is estimated with  US data. Note that the  structural  change
hypothesis was advanced on the basis of US experience. A battery of Chow tests
are perfo-rmed  for equality of coefficients for periods prior to and after 1973.
To assess  the significance  of  the additional  variables introduced in  the  extended
model, the same tests are also performed with the conventional demand  model that
does not include the energy price and capital variables.
The joint null hypothesis of no structural change in all parameters is
tested first  (see Annex Table 1 for test results). With the extended demand
model, this hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level for all base
metals except for zinc; with the conventional demand model, it is rejected for
all base metals at the 1% significance level. Thus, the inclusion of energy and
capital variables helps explain the decline in  metals intensity  to a degree, but
not enough to invalidate the structural change hypothesis.
The next task is to isolate the parameters that were most responsible for
-19-the seeming  structural shift.  Three  of the  parameters are  of particular interest:
the output coefficient, the intercept, and the coefficient of the time trend.
A decline in the output coefficient would indicate a change in the output mix.
A decline  in the  intercept term would confirm the one-time  shift view. The
structural change view would get strong support if the time trend coefficient
declined, among other parameters.
Overall, the statistical evidence on shifts in the output coefficient was
rather  weak  for  both  the  conventional  and  the  extended  models.  The  null
hypothesis of no change in  the output coefficient could not be rejected for all
metals when the extended model was estimated. It could be rejected only for
aluminum and copper with the conventional model. This result may be due to  the
choice  of  durable  manufactures  production  as  the  output  variable,  which
eliminates the changes in  the share of durables in total output. Fluctuation in
the  share  of durable  manufactures  in GDP  is  considered more  cyclical  than
structural.
Evidence  on  the  rate  of  technological  change,  or  the  time  trend
coefficient,  was  substantially  different  (see  Annex  Table  2).  With  the
conventional model, the null hypothesis of no structural change in the rate of
technical change is rejected at the 1% significance level for all the metals.
With the extended model, the null hypothesis was rejected for four out of six
metals but the power of the tests was substantially lower. This result appears
to  suggest  that  the  rate  of  metal-saving  technical  progress  signific&ntly
accelerated in  the post-1973 period for  most metals,  except possibly for  aluminum
and zinc.
Test results for the intercept present a similar picture to those of thle
output coefficient. With the extended model, it is diificult to say that the
intercept has shifted downward except for copper.  The conventional model yields
estimates supporting a  one-time efficiency improvement in  the post-1973 period.
-20-Thus, what appears to have  been a one-time shift in  the efficiency of metals use
could have been mostly the effect of higher energy prices.
In summary, test results lend some support to the view that the rate of
metals-saving technological changes accelerated  after the first oil price shock.
This  finding, however, opens the question of whether or  to what extent the
acceleration was caused  by higher oil prices. Has the rate decelerated after oil
prices  declined?  This  last  question  cannot  be  answered  yet.  Results  also
indicate that the relationship betweerL  metals demand and durable manufactures
production did not change; there was no strong  evidence of "decoupling." Nor can
the data support the view of a one-time efficiency improvement after the oil
price shock. By extending the demand model to include  all relevant input prices,
including  energy, it  was possible to distinguish, to some  extent, the effects of
higher energy prices from those of structural change. A mis-specified demand
model, such  as the conventional demand model that leaves  out relevant variables,
can lead to the wrong inference about structural changes.4
V.  CONCLUSIONS
The  growth  rate  of  world raw  materials  consumption slowed  drastically after
the first oil price shock, from 4-10% annually for most metals to 1-2%. For the
4  Estimates of the extended demand model also reveal that variations in
metals consumption are mostly explained by changes in  durable goods production.
The estimated demand elasticities with respect to durable goods range from 0.4
to 1.1. Copper; nickel and aluminum have higher output elasticities than tin,
lead and zinc.  Furthermore, the output elasticity does  not appear  to have
significantly declined between the periods 1950-73 and 1974-85. The estimates
generally  indicate  that metals  are complements with  energy  and capital  but
substitutes  with labor.  Energy  plays an  important role  in  explaining aluminum and
zinc consumption; the weak statistical significance in the  case of  aluminum
improves dramatically when the wage rate variable is eliminated. Labor cost is
a  statistically  significant explanatory  variable  for all the  metals  except
aluminum. Capital stock has a  negative coefficient for all metals except zinc,
suggesting that they are substitutes in the production process.
-21-agricultural raw materials, however, the decline has been far less pronounced.
The fact that the decline started when oil pricea increased would suggest that
the  negative  offact on  metals  demand of  energy-saving substitution,  technological
changes, and adverse  macroeconomic impact of  higher energy prices outweighed the
positive effect through higher costs of synthetic substitutes. Any increase in
cotton  and  natural  rubber  consumption  that  resulted  from  higher  costs  of
synthetic fibers and rubber must have been relatively small.
Most  of  the  decline  in  raw  materials  consumption  took  place  in the
industrial  economies.  In  developing  countries,  the  trend  increase  in  the
intensity of raw materials consumption per unit of output continued wiith  only
temporary interruptions at times of high  oil prices, because of relatively rapid
expansion  of  materials-intensive  sectors  and  lags  in  adapting  to  latest
materials-efficient  technologies. The-  developing countries, particularly  the
rapidly industrializing developing countries, will continue to provide the main
growth market for raw  materials in the 1990s.  Consumption growth in  the formerly
non-market economies also slowed down sharply during the past decade, but the
dominant cause there is likely to have been poor economic growth.
The  issue  of  whether  the  post-1973  decline  in  raw  materLals  demand
represents  a  permanent,  irreversible,  or  "structural" change  hat  important
implications for developing countries heavily dependent on exports of those
commodities. There have been divergent views on this issue. Statistical tests of
alternative hypotheses suggest  that the downturn has been only partly cyclical.
Nor  is  there  strong  evidence  to  support  the  view  that  it  was  a  one-time
improvement  in  the  efficiency  of  raw  materials  use.  The  most  plausible
interpretation,  supported  by  statistical evidence, is that there has been  an
acceleration  of materials-saving  technological  changes, probably  induced by
higher  energy  prices.  It  is  an  open  question  whether  materials-saving
technological changes will continue at the accelerated rate, when energy prices
are  lower. Experience  over the last three years suggests that the  rate may
-22-already  have  slowed  down.  If  this  indeed  is  the  case,  then  the  change  cannot  be
billed as structural.
For the developing  countries  dependent  on raw materials exports,  the
findings  of  this  paper  present  a  cautiously  optimistic  outlook  for  their  export.
than what  was the prevailing  view in  early 1980e.  The  demand  outlook  even for
lead and tin, once considered  dead industries,  now appear  mildly  promising.
Ho,wever,  advances in material science could still pose a threat to theae
countries,  especially  if  the  rate  of  material-saving  technical  progress  continues
to accelerate  despite  lower  energy  prices.
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ALUMINUM  7.86**  (5,26)  5.39**  (8,20)
COPPER  11.63**  (5,25)  3.06*  (8,19)
LEAD  15.74**  (4,28)  8.46**  (7,22)
NICKEL  9.78**  (4,22)  4.24**  (7,16)
TIN  8.58**  (4,28)  3.03*  (7,22)
ZINC  40.94**  (4,28)  0.98  (7,22)
TOTAL  METALS  31.72**  (4,28)  4.01**  (8,20)
--------------------------------------------------------------- ___------------
NOTE:  F-TEST  STATISTICS  WITH  THE  NOMINATOR  AND  DENOMINATOR  DEGREES  OF  FREEDOM
SHOWN IN  PARENTHESES.
*  SIGNIFICANT  AT  5* LEVEL.  **  SIGNIFICANT  AT  1% LEVEL.
SOURCE:  CHOE  (1989).
TABLE  2: CHOW-TEST  STATISTICS  FOR  STRUCTURAL  CHANGE:




ALUMINUM  24.39**  (1,26)  0.90  (1,20)
COPPER  20.03**  (1,25)  5.28*  (1,19)
LEAD  34.56**  (1,28)  6.89*  (1,22)
NICKEL  19.36**  (1,22)  7.7C*  (1,16)
TIN  11.07**  (1,28)  8.06**  (1,22)
ZINC  9.78**  (1,28)  0.72  (1,22)
TOTAL  METALS  35.64**  (1,28)  3.22  (1,20)
----------------------------------------------------------------- __----------
NOTEs  F-TEST  STATISTICS  WITH  THE  NOMINATOR  AND  DENOMINATOR  DEGREES  OF  FREEDOM
SHOWN IN  PARENTHESES.
*  SIGNIFICANT  AT  5% LEVEL.  **  SIGNIFICANT  AT  1% LEVEL.
SOURCE:  CHOE  (1989).
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